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MARKETS, REGULATION, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
James L. Huffman*
The environmental movement has been a great success in
many measurable ways. Lake Erie, once an enormous sewer, is now
swimmable. The Cayahoga River is no longer in danger of sponta-
neous combustion. It is once again possible, on occasion, to see the
mountains that rim the Los Angeles Basin. In Missoula, people no
longer breathe the smoke from tepee burners. In some cases, we
know by merely looking that things are better than they were a few
decades ago, but we can also document many invisible environ-
mental improvements in parts per million, and perhaps even in
lives saved.
I. How GOES ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION?
Most of the environmental improvement has resulted from
government regulation-the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act,
the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, and so on and so
on. These laws have limited permissible emissions, mandated par-
ticular technologies, imposed liabilities, and they have forbade
some activities. It has been command and control regulation and it
appears to have succeeded. But has it been successful? What is the
measure of success? Why are our environmental laws and regula-
tors subject to widespread criticism?
Addressing the last question first, we might conclude that the
criticism is largely from those whose activities are regulated and
upon whom liabilities have been imposed. We should not be sur-
prised that they would object. But the criticism comes not only
from the regulated, indeed many polluters prefer the certainties of
a regulatory system they know to the uncertainties of some un-
known approach to environmental protection. In the dual Ameri-
can traditions of free enterprise and interest group politics, many
of the regulated have learned how to profit from environmental
regulation.
Notwithstanding the remarkable progress we have made,
much of the criticism of environmental regulation comes from
traditional environmental organizations and respected environ-
mental advocates. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), for
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example, broke with environmental orthodoxy to support the mar-
ket oriented acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments. The more orthodox environmental organizations like the Si-
erra Club and the Natural Resources Defence Council have
generally claimed that environmental regulations do not go far
enough and that the environmental regulators are often lax in en-
forcing those regulations which do exist.
In the West, widespread dissatisfaction among environmental-
ists about public lands management plays a large part in the eco-
nomics and politics of the region. For much of the West, the clear-
cut slopes of the Bitterroot National Forest are a barometer of
environmental quality, just as parts per million of air and water
pollution have been the measure of environmental success and fail-
ure in the East. The ongoing battles over spotted owls and old
growth forests in the Pacific Northwest underscore the dissatisfac-
tion with public land management that the mainline environmen-
tal groups share.
II. THE ORTHODOXY OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
However, the fact that environmentalists are often unhappy,
despite the progress made to protect the environment, does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that they are disillusioned with
command and control regulation and public management. To the
contrary, with occasional exceptions like EDF's support of tradable
emissions permits, environmental advocates remain staunchly com-
mitted to pollution control through regulation, and resource man-
agement through public ownership. The orthodox view is that the
shortcomings of our environmental protection efforts result not
from relying on the wrong approaches, but from not enough com-
mand and control regulation.
Although market approaches to environmental protection have
achieved greater currency in public discussions in the last few
years, mainstream environmentalism remains firmly committed to
the general view that markets are the source of environmental
problems and that proactive government is the solution. The ac-
cepted theory is that private actors, motivated by a desire for short
term profit, ignore the impacts that their actions have on other
people, the environment, and future generations. This theory leads
to the conclusion that government must intervene by regulating
private actions. When, as often happens, the government regula-
tors fail to do their jobs, the orthodox environmentalist remedy is
to regulate the regulators through laws like the National Environ-
mental Policy Act and the Federal Lands Planning and Manage-
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ment Act.
The case for regulation, to put it in the more sophisticated
language of economics, is that external costs associated with pri-
vate actions exist, which markets do not account for because those
who bear those external costs are not parties to the market trans-
actions. It is indisputable that future generations and the environ-
ment itself are not market participants. It is often true that some
people are excluded from market decisions-sometimes because
the cost they suffer is in the form of a denial of a public good, and
sometimes because the institutionalized rights system prevents
them from effectively participating in market transactions. How-
ever, the existence of external costs and private actors' failure to
consider environmental impacts do not automatically lead to the
conclusion that regulation and public management are the
remedies.
Orthodox environmentalism's preference for command and
control regulation is rooted less in a sophisticated understanding of
public goods and externalities theories than it is in a philosophical
objection to capitalism combined with a revival of the progressivist
belief in scientific management. The fact that a few individuals
made huge fortunes during the late 19th and early 20th century
development of the continent does not sit well with most environ-
mentalists, notwithstanding that much of the environmentalists' fi-
nancial support comes from the foundations made possible by
those private fortunes. It is widely believed that a direct correla-
tion exists between economic development and environmental de-
struction, although the experience of the late 20th century-in
Eastern Europe, Latin America, and much of Asia and Af-
rica-demonstrates that the correlation is inverse.
III. ANOTHER ORTHODOXY: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
Scientific management was the faith of the conservationists
who launched an earlier era of environmentalism at the turn of the
century. Emblematic was Gifford Pinchot, first chief of the Forest
Service, and close associate of President Theodore Roosevelt.
Pinchot brought science to American forestry, and a tradition of
professional scientific management to the Forest Service which in-
sulated that agency from most political storms until the middle of
the century. Although political controversy would eventually come
to the Forest Service, efforts at reform did not abandon the com-
mitment to the Progressive tradition of scientific management.
The modern environmental movement, born with the inspira-
tion of scientists like Rachel Carson and Paul Ehrlich, has adhered
1994] 427
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to the Progressive faith. Science, it is argued, will allow us to un-
derstand the environmental consequences of our actions and guide
our pursuit of solutions. Like the conservationists who preceded
them, modern environmentalists have appealed to political institu-
tions while urging that science, not politics, will determine what
actions we should take. The Clinton Administration's commitment
to the idea of ecosystem management, which is to be launched with
a National Biological Survey, promises a new level of sophistica-
tion in scientific management.
Like the Progressives before them, the would-be ecosystem
managers imagine that science can lead us to a correct substantive
result. Science will free us from the vissitudes of politics in our
public decision making. Scientists, relying upon the best scientific
understanding of our ecosystem, will tell us what we need to do
and how to do it. Their reliance is, of course, a vain hope, rooted
either in naivete or deception.
Public decisions are by definition political decisions. They are
social choices based upon an aggregation of the values of those who
have political influence. Scientists have no special capacity in se-
lecting among competing values. To the extent that we rely upon
them, we have simply given them the power to make our social
choices for us.
If we recognize that scientific managers ought to have no spe-
cial role in setting public policy, we might nonetheless look to
them for advice on how best to achieve the policy goals we set for
ourselves through the political process. This is how we must view
the ambition of ecosystem management. We must first accept that
ecosystem protection is a good idea, and have some conception of
what sort of ecosystems we mean to sustain, and then look to
scientists to tell us how to do it.
But even if we agree that ecosystem management is a good
idea, and we agree what we mean by that concept, there is a re-
markable hubris in thinking that we have the understanding and
capacity to manage anything so complex as a natural ecosystem.
Perhaps ecosystem management means only that humans should
withdraw and leave the management to mother nature. But
humans cannot withdraw, indeed some would be so bold as to sug-
gest that humans are part of the ecosystem, so ecosystem manage-
ment must be understood to mean that we will somehow manage
our actions so as to have no impacts on the ecosystem. Most envi-
ronmentalists would agree that the Department of Interior, faced
with far less ambitious objectives, has for a century or more bun-
gled the management of the lands it administers. How, one won-
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ders, will Bruce Babbitt get the various agencies in the Depart-
ment of Interior to become effective ecosystem managers?
IV. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAYS THINGS ARE GETTING
DYSFUNCTIONAL
As suggested at the outset, the last couple of decades have wit-
nessed significant successes in environmental protection. Rivers
and lakes are swimmable, the air is breathable, and hazardous
wastes are being cleaned up. Surely this is progress. However,
much environmentalist rhetoric would have us believe that we
have made barely a dent in the environmental problems we still
face, and that our prospects for doing better are apparently not
very bright.
Indeed, the Vice President of the United States has concluded
from his study of the global environment that society is dysfunc-
tional. That sounds bad. Really bad. For the Vice President, dys-
function is evidenced by scientific reports on the condition of the
environment and by the way we live our lives. We are too self-
possessed, too greedy, too short-sighted and we have little sense of
community. Rather than having made progress over the last de-
cades, it would seem that we have been on a steady slide to envi-
ronmental armageddon.
Why do the Vice President and most the leaders of our envi-
ronmental organizations believe that we are at risk of losing the
struggle to save the planet? What would be their measure of pro-
gress or success? Will a fully implemented system of ecosystem
management on the public lands be progress? Will a total ban on
chloroflorocarbons be progress? How about a reduction in global
carbon emissions to the pre-1990 level? Will an international
agreement to protect endangered species be an environmental suc-
cess? Perhaps a thriving population of northern spotted owls will
convince the Vice President that our society is at least marginally
functional.
Of course, different people will have different answers to these
questions. Because mainstream environmentalists are committed
to scientific management, and often have philosophical objections
to capitalism, they tend to measure success not by the quality of
human lives or even the quality of the natural environment, but
rather by the extent to which we rely on governmental institutions
committed to scientific management. The measure of success is
more in the method than in the result.
From a social point of view, society must often measure suc-
cess by the methods used rather than the results achieved. Long
1994] 429
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ago, we realized in the law that process is critical to the achieve-
ment of the substantive objectives of individuals, particularly in
light of the human tendency to abuse the powers of government.
The concept of the rule of law is rooted in reliance on the
processes of the law as a means of avoiding the rule of man or
woman. We resort to process because we cannot agree on sub-
stance. Most environmental laws evidence the difficulty of agreeing
on substantive standards. Where we have done so in our pollution
laws, we have seldom found the means or mustered the will to
achieve them. The notable exception has been the Endangered
Species Act, which sets a substantive standard of no species loss.
However, Congress amended that statute to create a process for
overriding that standard.
V. MARKETS AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Thus far, this essay has been critical, arguing that command
and control regulation and public management, while delivering
some environmental gains, have fallen far short of the ambitions of
virtually all mainline environmental groups. What is the alterna-
tive? As indicated earlier, the orthodox environmental view seems
to be that we should get better at command and control regulation
and public management. Environmentalists would have the law re-
formed to lessen the influence of environmentally destructive in-
terests and to assure that the public interest, rather than special
interests, prevails. If this approach is chosen, little reason exists for
optimism. I would thus urge an alternative approach, which some
have labeled free market environmentalism.
I am not a purist about markets. I am a pragmatist and a real-
ist. Pragmatism leads me to acknowledge that markets sometimes
fail in the sense that external costs do befall third parties and
some goods are public and therefore subject to free riding. Realism
leads me to recognize that politically allocated wealth, with all of
its allocational inefficiencies, is not easily reallocated. Command
and control regulation and public land management will remain
our dominant resource allocation approaches in this country.
Therefore, this essay argues both the purist's case for markets and
the pragmatic realist's case for markets.
The purist case for markets rests on the proposition that the
best measure of resource value is the aggregated choices that indi-
viduals make through free market transactions. If Jim offers for
sale 100 acres of wilderness for which Plum Creek offers $100,000
and the Wilderness Society offers $200,000, Jim will sell to the
Wilderness Society, improving Jim's situation while allocating the
[Vol. 55
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resource to its highest valued use.
Only a market assures this sort of result, argue the purists,
because all other allocational institutions are political and there-
fore rely on political influence in one form or another, not upon
willingness to pay. In the above example, the timber industry
might have more political influence than the wilderness lobby and
thus achieve, through the political process, a misallocation of the
100 acres in question. In that example, net social welfare will be
diminished by $100,000 if we do not rely on markets. This hypo-
thetical is not just economic theory. Hundreds of thousands of
acres acquired by habitat and ecosystem protection groups belie
the common assumption that the timber company will always be
able to outbid the wilderness protectors.
Consider another example involving water. In the 1970s we ex-
perienced a growing demand for instream water uses. The law of
most western states made a diversion a requisite for a water right.
Thus, water appropriators could not provide instream water uses.
Most instream use advocates urged that states mandate the main-
tenance of minimum instream flows. These advocates presumed
command and control regulation to be the remedy. An alternative
was to reform the property institutions on which markets depend
by permitting appropriation for instream uses. Many states
adopted this reform, but then refused to permit private acquisition
of such instream rights. Moreover, western water law continues to
impose various restraints on water rights transfers, making it diffi-
cult to shift water from lower valued consumptive uses to higher
valued instream uses. A properly reformed private rights system
combined with a free market would result in significant realloca-
tions of water to instream uses.
As this example indicates, markets often seem to fail when the
system of legal rights has failed to provide the necessary context
for market transactions. Even in the face of numerous legal obsta-
cles, markets result in the private provision of many environmental
benefits. The Nature Conservancy, Ducks Unlimited, and other
private organizations do acquire lands for habitat and ecosystem
protection. Although it is frowned upon in this state, private land-
owners do provide excellent habitat for game and fish, which they
market to willing purchasers. For the anti-hunters, private land-
owners market wildlife viewing-even butterfly reserves. For exam-
ple, the private forests of northern Maine long have supplied recre-
ational opportunities to the large populations of the Northeast.
If we removed the institutional obstacles to market transac-
tions, not the least of which are the massive subsidies that state
1994]
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and local government provide to destroyers of the environment,
environmental protection would surely benefit. Environmentalists
should not allow their prejudices against private ownership and
personal profit to stand in the way of achieving their environmen-
tal objectives. Orthodox environmentalists could profit from un-
derstanding a central operating premise among free market envi-
ronmentalists-namely, incentives matter.
We can plead with our neighbors and countrymen to be better
citizens, to do what is right by the environment, but if we want
results we must provide incentives. Volunteerism has seldom con-
tributed much to the solving of public problems. Environmental-
ists have advocated recycling for twenty years or more. While true
that recycling centers have existed throughout that period, their
impact on the solid waste stream was insignificant until people
were given reasons to recycle. Rather than free curbside collection
of garbage as a sort of constitutional right, some cities, like Seattle,
instituted charges based on weight. This gave people an incentive
to recycle as a way of reducing the weight of their garbage. Simi-
larly, Oregon's bottle bill has kept the state's roads free of bever-
age container litter, and the state pays young people to pick up the
litter that motorists have no incentive to dispose of properly. In-
centives have gotten results that education could not, although
market purists insist that the result achieved is not always a good
one. In Portland, where we have free curbside pickup of numerous
recyclables, we have substituted mountains of unmarketable glass
and paper for landfills.
The concept of tradeable emissions permits gradually is gain-
ing credibility as a legitimate approach to air and water pollution
control. The theory is simple. If a government regulation com-
mands a polluter to reduce emissions to a specified level, the pol-
luter has no incentive to emit less than the maximum. If the pol-
luter has a permit to emit a maximum level of pollution and also is
allowed to sell a portion of that emission authorization to other
polluters, an incentive to reduce pollution below the maximum
permitted is created. Under such a system, total pollution can be
reduced by environmentalist acquisition and retirement of permits.
The acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments and a
few other laws have provided laboratories to test the theory.
Most environmental groups have opposed the tradeable emis-
sions approach, generally on the ground that no one should have a
right to pollute. It is often a moral argument about right and
wrong and the nature of things. These moral arguments lead inexo-
rably to the implausible case for zero pollution. In a world of or-
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ganic and inorganic processes, with or without humans, zero pollu-
tion is neither possible nor desirable. Any moral arguments about
pollution, like economic arguments, must seek to define optimality.
Environmentalists would be well advised to recognize that market-
able emission permits will sometimes get them closer to their opti-
mum than will command and control regulation.
Environmental quality, like other things which people value,
does not come at no cost. In the language of economics, clean air
has opportunity costs. To have cleaner air we must either give up
something or have incentives to figure out how to have our cake
and eat it too. The production of goods and the provision of ser-
vices almost always produce pollution. Markets will sometimes cre-
ate incentives which produce more goods and services with the
same or even less pollution. The consumers of these goods and ser-
vices, many of which are essential to human survival and dignity,
will have the better of moral arguments that pit human welfare
against zero pollution.
Another obvious case for markets, notwithstanding the Clin-
ton Administration's ambition to turn the Bureau of Reclamation
into a water planning and management agency, is water allocation.
Of course, it is no small irony that the Bureau of Reclamation is
the would-be water czar. Water allocation throughout the West,
and especially in California, is largely the product of massive gov-
ernment intervention by the Bureau of Reclamation and other
state and federal agencies.
Some water users in California pay as little as five dollars an
acre foot for water. Others pay as much as two thousand dollars an
acre foot to desalinate water. This disparity is economic and envi-
ronmental nonsense of a magnitude that only politics can produce.
A reasonably functioning water market in California and the West
would go much of the way to eliminating water shortages, even
during times of drought. Water markets would provide incentives
for efficient water use. History leaves no doubt that such incentives
would be more effective than any regulatory and educational cam-
paign that the well-intentioned people at Reclamation might
conceive.
Finally, think about the role of the common law in all of this.
Markets function on the basis of property rights and contract
rights. Market decisions are influenced by liabilities of the tort and
criminal law. To achieve environmental benefits through markets,
we must restore the role of these common law institutions. Ortho-
dox environmentalism, however, has written off the common law as
a source of the environmental problem. In the context of water, the
1994]
9
Huffman: Markets, Regulation, and Environmental Protection
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1994
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
foregoing discussion evinces the importance of a well-designed sys-
tem of property rights.
VI. EVALUATING THE ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE OF OUR
INSTITUTIONS
Apply the following test when evaluating alternative institu-
tions for allocating the scarce resources of our environment:
WHICH INSTITUTIONS WILL ACHIEVE OUR ENVIRON-
MENTAL GOALS (whatever they may be) AT LEAST COST? No
institutions are perfect. We must not reject an approach because it
can be demonstrated to have failed under certain circumstances.
Markets fail. Political institutions fail. The question we must ask
ourselves is what institutional arrangement is least likely to fail
under the circumstances we face. Neither markets nor command
and control regulation will solve all of our environmental problems,
but the environment will clearly suffer if we do not give markets a
chance.
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